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New Mexico State University
For more than three decades, Vernon M. Briggs Jr. argued that U.S. 
immigration policy should be determined largely on the basis of the 
nation’s rapidly changing labor-market trends. In Briggs’s view, U.S. 
immigration policy and the needs of the labor market have been mis-
matched. He has been particularly concerned about a new (fourth) wave 
of migration with detrimental effects disproportionately felt by un-
skilled workers and minorities, especially blacks and Hispanics. What 
is needed, Briggs argues, is an immigration policy that reduces the mas-
sive fl ow of international migration to the United States and matches 
the characteristics of immigrants with genuine labor force needs.
Briggs’s policy conclusions are based on a careful, detailed analysis 
of immigration law and the often-unintended consequences of changes 
in immigration law. His analysis is logical, subtle, and compelling. Yet 
Congress has failed to pass immigration legislation consistent with 
changing labor-market conditions and needs.
The latest attempt to pass a major immigration reform law in 2007 
contained some elements consistent with Briggs’s proposals, but it had 
almost no chance of being passed by a deeply divided Congress. Not 
surprisingly, there were no major immigration law changes in the 2008 
presidential election year, nor did immigration policy play a major role 
during the presidential campaign. Immigration was simply too con-
troversial for either major party to bring into play. Given the global 
economic and fi nancial crisis that became more serious in late 2008 and 
continued into 2009, immigration is not likely to be a high priority on 
the policy agenda of Congress or the Obama administration. In brief, 
major U.S. immigration reform may not occur for many years.
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The immigration problem is not intractable. The main theme of this 
chapter is that policies designed to accelerate the process of economic 
development in migrant-sending nations should be the key element of 
an overall immigration policy. Certainly, the convoluted, illogical, con-
tradictory, and generally unenforced mess that is now immigration law 
in the United States is badly in need of reform, and Briggs’s suggested 
labor-market-oriented changes to immigration policy could form a solid 
foundation for such reform. Changes in the law, however, cannot di-
rectly affect the root causes of migration. In contrast, rapid economic 
development in the sending nations can affect the fl ow of migration.
The development of this thesis is not a critique of Briggs’s analy-
sis and does not contradict his major research and policy conclusions. 
Most of the key ingredients of the argument presented here can be 
found in Briggs’s own works. While his work has focused mainly on 
the inconsistency between U.S. labor-market needs and immigration 
policy, he has consistently mentioned the need for economic develop-
ment and economic-development assistance, particularly to Mexico, as 
one element in a comprehensive strategy. The proposal developed here 
represents only a change in emphasis. In brief, U.S. immigration reform 
will not reduce the fl ow of international migration to the United States 
unless major sending regions are more successful in their economic-
development efforts.
Two related labor-market issues also need to be addressed briefl y. 
First, whether or not immigration fl ows are increasing, the United States 
must address the educational and workforce training needs of its resi-
dents in a fashion consistent with rapidly changing economic trends and 
labor-market conditions. Although the previous sentence is not a direct 
quote from Briggs’s published works, it will surely sound familiar to 
those who have read them.
Almost every release of data on U.S. educational attainment paints 
a deteriorating picture, and the No Child Left Behind Act has failed to 
reverse these trends. Institutions of higher education are struggling with 
tight budgets and increasing costs, and state and local governments are 
unlikely to provide the needed resources.
The educational and workforce training problem is national in 
scope and needs to be addressed at the federal level. The need to do 
so is obvious. In February 2009, the unemployment rate among those 
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with less than a high-school education was 15.1 percent, whereas the 
comparable rate for those with a bachelor’s degree or higher was 4.2 
percent (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009). Income levels by edu-
cation show similar disparities. What the nation does with immigration 
policy will matter little over the next several decades unless there is 
a huge effort to provide education and training for all U.S. residents 
consistent with success in an increasingly high-technology and interna-
tionalized economy.
Second, there is no excuse for failing to address the U.S. unem-
ployment problem. The opportunity cost of employing the unemployed 
is zero.1 The unemployed are, from an economic perspective, wasted 
resources who do not add to the nation’s output. Little imagination is re-
quired to devise policies to eliminate unemployment, and there is more 
than enough useful work that needs to be done.
It is obvious that macroeconomic stability and relatively strong 
long-term economic growth during the quarter century from 1982 to 
2007 have not been suffi cient to ensure employment for all of those 
who want to work. The current economic crisis brings added urgency to 
the unemployment problem. In February 2009, the U.S. unemployment 
rate reached 8.1 percent, and many analysts expect continued labor-
market deterioration (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009).
In early 2009, 12.5 million people in the United States were unem-
ployed, an additional 5.6 million wanted a job but quit looking for work, 
and 4.0 million others worked part time but would have preferred to 
work full time (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009). In 2008, the av-
erage U.S. worker added about $100,000 to the nation’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) (author calculations based on U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 2009). The lost output from 12.5 million unemployed persons 
is more than a trillion dollars.
Although there are indications that immigration to the United 
States, particularly from Mexico, has declined during the current eco-
nomic downturn, it remains a rather odd policy to allow in-migration 
when there are millions of current U.S. residents without a job. Even 
stranger is that the nation tolerates domestic unemployment on a large 
scale even though there are policy options available to eliminate all or 
nearly all of it.
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There are several powerful arguments for placing economic de-
velopment, education, workforce training, and unemployment higher 
on the policy priority list than immigration reform. First, as indicated 
above, the U.S. political process is not likely to soon produce immigra-
tion reform or allocate immigration enforcement resources along the 
lines suggested by Briggs. Second, the politics of immigration reform 
will be easier to address once U.S. unemployment is reduced to zero (or 
almost zero), the educational and training needs of the current and fu-
ture labor force are adequately addressed, and migrant-sending nations 
are progressing rapidly. Third, economic development issues, unem-
ployment, and education issues need to be addressed whether or not 
the nation grapples with the immigration issue. Fourth, the immigration 
issue is far more complex and contentious than the other three issues. 
Unfortunately, there is little reason for optimism that the nation will 
seriously address any of these issues, including immigration reform.
AUTHOR BIASES 
Gunnar Myrdal, a Nobel Laureate in economics, argued forcefully 
that there is no such thing as a value-free social science (Myrdal 1968). 
Myrdal argued the best we can do is be as aware of our value judgments 
and biases as possible and state them explicitly. Not doing so leads to a 
false sense of scientifi c objectivity.
With that in mind, I fi rst confess that I took three classes in la-
bor economics from Briggs when I was an undergraduate majoring in 
mathematics at the University of Texas at Austin in the 1960s. I have 
respected him and his work very highly for more than four decades. I 
am honored to have the opportunity to contribute a chapter to this vol-
ume. I am equally honored that after more than four decades he remains 
a valued friend and colleague.
Second, I have always shared Briggs’s concern over the plight of 
the poor. His concern for the underprivileged is genuine, and whether 
he is addressing immigration or other structural imbalances in the econ-
omy, that value judgment or bias is apparent.
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Third, in 1974 (or possibly early 1975), I was extraordinarily privi-
leged to listen to a great debate on immigration policy between Briggs 
and his University of Texas colleague Wendell C. Gordon at the supper 
seminar series sponsored by the university’s Department of Economics. 
The supper seminar series was always a well-attended and intellectually 
stimulating event. The Briggs–Gordon debate on immigration was the 
best of them all. Briggs presented the case for a more restrictive border 
policy, while Gordon presented the case for a more open border. Both 
participants’ remarks were later published in the Social Science Journal 
(Briggs 1975; Gordon 1975). Better short statements of the two oppos-
ing sides of the immigration debate are hard to fi nd, and I still have my 
students read those articles. Today, I have the same mixed feelings about 
the immigration issue that I had more than 30 years ago during this great 
debate. As Briggs has maintained, the labor-market consequences of 
relatively unconstrained immigration are felt disproportionately by the 
unskilled and poor. At the same time, borders and nationalism broadly 
defi ned are impediments to the process of economic development. Sort-
ing out the issues about the costs and benefi ts of migration empirically 
is an almost impossible task.
Finally, both Briggs and I are long-standing members and past-
presidents of the Association for Evolutionary Economics. We share 
a common intellectual heritage dating back to the works of Thorstein 
Veblen, John R. Commons, and Clarence E. Ayres. The institutional or 
evolutionary tradition places great emphasis on technological and in-
stitutional change as major determinants of the way economies evolve. 
Among institutional economists, there is no automatic assumption that 
markets will cure all economic problems. Yet institutionalists, like 
mainstream economists, have expressed very different and sometimes 
confl icting views on immigration. Veblen regarded borders and restric-
tions on immigration as signifi cant obstacles to the effi cient functioning 
of the industrial system. Commons thought that restrictions on immi-
gration were needed. A brief attempt to examine and reconcile these 
views is presented in Peach (2007).
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CONTRASTING BRIGGS’S PERSPECTIVE WITH SOME 
FALSE ISSUES
Briggs’s view toward immigration is that the size of the migration 
fl ow to the United States and the characteristics of those who migrate 
here should complement, rather than disrupt, the functioning of the U.S. 
labor market. Briggs argues that U.S. immigration issues could, for the 
most part, be ignored during the 1950s and early 1960s when migration 
fl ows were relatively small. Conversely, he argues that the increased 
migration fl ows that occurred during the last quarter century can no 
longer be ignored (Briggs 1984, 1992, 2003).
Briggs’s perspective does not imply some numerically precise opti-
mal level of immigration in a dynamic, modern economy. There simply 
can be no such optimal or desirable migration rate. As a practical mat-
ter, Briggs argues that the appropriate number of migrants in any given 
year should be determined administratively on the basis of labor-market 
conditions (fewer migrants should be admitted when unemployment 
rates are high, for example).
A zero migration or zero net-migration policy, promoted by some 
politicians and commentators, is not the position advocated by Briggs. 
Zero migration and zero net-migration are very different concepts, but 
both are absurd notions in an increasingly internationalized or global 
economic system. Zero migration presumably means no migration—
either into or out of a nation. Zero net-migration means that the number 
of immigrants would exactly equal the number of emigrants, a highly 
unlikely occurrence. Neither policy could be demographically neutral 
in the sense of not affecting population size (Bouvier et al. 1995). Zero 
net-migration is not likely to be demographically neutral because the 
age and fertility patterns of immigrants and emigrants are likely to be 
different. Zero migration cannot be demographically neutral because 
prohibiting all migration would also change a society’s fertility and 
mortality rates.
There are other reasons to reject any notion of zero U.S. migration. 
For example, such a policy would be virtually impossible to enforce 
in a democratic society. Further, the aging of the U.S. population and 
fertility rates near or perhaps even below replacement levels are hard to 
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ignore. Without some level of net in-migration, the prospect of a shrink-
ing U.S. labor force is very real. The United Nations reports that more 
than 40 percent of the world’s population already lives in nations with a 
fertility rate that is below replacement level and that this fi gure is likely 
to increase in coming decades (United Nations 2006).
Economists and policymakers have not yet determined how to deal 
with issues of economic growth or the provision of goods and services 
in an economy with a declining labor force. In a very meaningful sense, 
some migration will be essential to keep the U.S. economy growing 
and to maintain or increase per-capita income over the next decades. 
Moreover, the Social Security issue complicates the immigration is-
sue considerably. With an aging population and population growth due 
to natural increase slowing down, migration is particularly needed to 
fund future Social Security obligations. In short, zero migration simply 
won’t work.
The U.S. immigration debate often focuses on numeric estimates 
of the stock or fl ow of (legal and illegal) immigrants. Are the num-
bers increasing or decreasing? Where are the migrants from? What are 
their characteristics? These are important and meaningful questions in 
a policy context. Yet there are no precise numeric answers to many of 
these questions, and this is particularly the case with regard to estimates 
of illegal migrants. Despite the best efforts of demographers and econo-
mists, estimates of the stock and fl ow of illegal migration to the United 
States are undoubtedly wrong and contribute little to a resolution of 
the immigration debate. Over the last decade or two, the U.S. Census 
Bureau has amply documented an increase in the number and propor-
tion of the foreign-born U.S. population. The trends in the foreign-born 
population of the United States could not have occurred without sig-
nifi cant in-migration. In a policy context, the Census estimates of the 
foreign-born population provide enough information to formulate im-
migration policy (for example, see Briggs 2003).
Congress and the President, however, address most policy issues 
without “adequate” data on the nature of the problem or the poten-
tial impact of proposed solutions. As Briggs (1984, p. 10) points out, 
“Obviously, reliable data are needed, but policy formulation and the se-
lection of topics for social science inquiry cannot depend on the quality 
of available data.” Fiscal and monetary policies designed to stimulate 
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the economy are adopted without adequate data indicating the magni-
tude of the problem. For example, no one really knows, or can possibly 
know, whether the current stimulus package (The American Recovery 
and Reinvestment Act of 2009) is too large or too small. Energy policy, 
Social Security policy, environmental policy, and countless other poli-
cies are also changed without adequate data.
Another false issue that clouds the immigration debate is ideol-
ogy. Immigration is not a liberal–conservative or left–right issue. The 
immigration views of conservatives and liberals, Democrats and Re-
publicans, and corporate executives and labor union leaders do not fall 
into neat and consistent categories. After all, immigration legislation is 
often the work of both liberals and conservatives and Republicans and 
Democrats. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) 
was commonly referred to as the Simpson–Rodino bill. Alan Simpson 
was a conservative Republican senator from Wyoming, whereas Peter 
Rodino was a more liberal Democratic U.S. representative from New 
Jersey.
The logic of market-oriented mainstream economics is that any bar-
rier to the mobility of resources or trade in goods and services inhibits 
the effi cient functioning of the economy. But not everyone who thinks 
that “markets work best” will also favor reducing restrictions on migra-
tion. Briggs has often discussed both the neoclassical economists’ lack 
of appropriate theoretical models of immigration and the false issue of 
ideology (see, for example, Briggs 1984, 1996, 2003). Immigration is-
sues do indeed make for strange bedfellows.
THE CASE FOR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AS
IMMIGRATION POLICY
An effective, perhaps the most effective, form of immigration pol-
icy is to promote economic development in migrant-sending nations. 
An important corollary to this thesis is that immigration-law reform—
no matter how well intentioned or well designed and regardless of the 
seriousness of efforts aimed at greater enforcement—will not substan-
tially reduce the fl ow of in-migration to the United States. International 
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migration is, after all, an international issue and not one that can be 
adequately addressed by domestic policy alone.
Enforcement of U.S. immigration laws has been about as effective 
as the enforcement of prohibition in the 1920s and early 1930s and 
perhaps less effective than the so-called war on drugs. Enforcement 
is inherently diffi cult and there have been a number of major changes 
to U.S. immigration law in the last 20 or more years.2 The IRCA leg-
islation of 1986 is probably the most widely known of these changes 
because it 1) made hiring immigrants without proper documentation 
illegal and 2) provided for amnesty, under certain conditions, for those 
who were already in the country illegally. IRCA, for the fi rst time, made 
employers potential targets of enforcement operations. Enforcement of 
the employment provisions of IRCA has been lax and has apparently 
had little effect on the fl ow of undocumented immigrants to the United 
States (for example, Abraham and Hamilton 2006).
After the events of September 11, 2001, immigration and customs 
enforcement were consolidated in a single agency, Immigration, Cus-
toms and Enforcement (ICE), within the Department of Homeland 
Security, and enforcement budgets were substantially increased. Be-
tween fi scal year 2005 and fi scal year 2009, the ICE budget increased 
from $3.6 billion to $5.9 billion, an increase of 63 percent in a four-year 
period (U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 2009). “Operation 
Jump Start” even brought National Guard troops to the U.S.–Mexico 
border in 2006 to assist in the enforcement effort, although those troops 
were reassigned in 2008.3 
In addition to revisions in immigration law and increased resources 
for enforcement, there has been considerable controversy over the con-
struction of a fence along the U.S.–Mexico border. Cost estimates of 
a border fence along the entire border vary considerably—from $47 
billion to $59 billion, not including maintenance, surveillance, or en-
forcement costs. Environmentalists, border residents, and border 
governors have been less than enthusiastic about the construction of 
the border fence. Governor Rick Perry (a Republican) of Texas and 
Governor Janet Napolitano (a Democrat, appointed as Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security in early 2009) of Arizona both op-
pose the fence for a number of reasons, each using a similar phrase to 
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describe its likely effectiveness: “Show me a 20 foot fence and I will 
show you a 21 foot ladder.”4
By most accounts (for example, Camarota 2007), migration fl ows 
to the United States were at record levels in the early 2000s despite 
changes in immigration law, greater expenditures on enforcement, and 
the construction of fences. If reducing the fl ow of in-migration to the 
United States is a desirable goal, it is reasonable to ask whether there is 
a more cost-effective mechanism for getting the job done.
Investing in the economic development of migrant-sending nations, 
particularly Mexico, could be a more effective use of scarce resources 
and provide other benefi ts as well. This economic-development 
suggestion is not an argument against meaningful revision of the con-
voluted and largely unenforced U.S. immigration laws. Indeed, if 
implemented, the economic-development policy as immigration policy 
idea could pave the way for successful implementation of immigration 
law based on U.S. labor-market needs as suggested by Briggs. 
The argument presented here is in the context of migration from 
Mexico to the United States—the issue that initially engaged Briggs’s 
interest and subsequent work on immigration policy (Briggs 1975).5 
Briggs, himself, did not ignore economic development as part of an 
overall strategy to reduce migration fl ows. In the 1970s, Briggs (1975, 
p. 483) stated: “With respect to the special problems associated with 
illegal entry from neighboring Mexico, the United States should make 
overtures to Mexico concerning how efforts could be made to devel-
op the economy of Mexico’s northern states.” He also argued that the 
United States “should carefully reassess its trade and tariff policies as 
they pertain to Mexico” (Briggs 1975, p. 483).
Briggs continues to maintain that economic-development assistance 
to sending nations should be part of the overall policy mix: “More at-
tention should also be given by national policies to addressing the push 
factors in the major source countries. More economic assistance should 
be made available and tailored to the particular factors in any coun-
try that cause so many of its citizens to leave their homeland” (Briggs 
2003, p. 280).
If there is a difference between Briggs’s views on the role of eco-
nomic development as migration policy and my own, it is a matter of 
emphasis. Briggs places reform of immigration law and increased en-
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forcement as the highest priorities, while the suggestion here is that 
mutually agreed upon development assistance would be more effective 
in reducing migration fl ows than immigration reform or enforcement.
What do we know about Mexican immigrants to the United States? 
Most of those born in Mexico and residing in the United States are not 
U.S. citizens (78.5 percent). More than a quarter (27.0 percent or roughly 
3.1 million) of these foreign-born noncitizens entered the United States 
between 2000 and 2006, even though migration from Mexico to the 
United States may have slowed down for a year or two after the terrorist 
attacks of September 2001 (U.S. Census Bureau 2007).6
Why do these immigrants come to the United States? Migration 
(domestic and international) occurs for many reasons. Migrants are mo-
tivated to relocate for personal reasons such as family reunifi cation, to 
seek political asylum (to fl ee real or imagined political persecution), 
and to satisfy inherent restlessness. Despite this wide range of reasons, 
economic motives for migration are amply supported by economic 
theory (Massey et al. 1994; Todaro 1969) and numerous empirical stud-
ies (see, for example, Greenwood and McDowell 1991; Passel 1990; 
Stark and Taylor 1989). In the case of Mexico and the United States, 
there is strong evidence that large U.S.–Mexico income disparities con-
tribute signifi cantly to U.S. migration from Mexico (see, for example, 
Díez-Cañedo Ruiz 1984; Passel 2006). That is why policies designed to 
reduce those income differentials could go a long way toward reducing 
migration fl ows between the two nations.
Economic growth theory generally suggests that income differenc-
es among nations and regions should disappear over the long run. To 
the extent that migration is motivated by economic concerns, income 
convergence should reduce migration to the United States in the long 
run. But, given the historical record and current policies, it will be a 
very long time before U.S.–Mexico income convergence occurs. Ac-
cording to World Bank data, U.S. GDP per person ($43,984) was 5.5 
times that of Mexico ($8,051; World Bank 2008).7 If Mexico’s GDP per 
person were to grow at 2 percent per year and U.S. GDP per person did 
not grow at all, income convergence between the two nations (as mea-
sured by GDP per person) would not occur until about 2091. We can 
be reasonably confi dent that this is too long to have an effect on early 
twenty-fi rst-century immigration fl ows or policy.
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The 2 percent per year growth rate used in this example is not en-
tirely arbitrary. GDP per person in the United States has grown at about 
2 percent per year for more than a century. If U.S. GDP per person 
continues to grow, then either a much higher growth rate in Mexico 
or a much longer time (perhaps centuries) will be required to achieve 
income convergence between the two nations.
The preferred solution, of course, is faster growth in Mexico and 
not slower U.S. growth. Rapid economic growth in Mexico is possible. 
The historical record suggests that the Mexican economy grew at very 
high rates from the 1940s to the early 1980s, a period commonly re-
ferred to as el milagro (the miracle). The rapid growth of the Mexican 
economy during the miracle years was associated with rapid urbaniza-
tion and even more rapid industrial growth.
Neither market forces nor current policies will reduce U.S.–Mexico 
income differentials enough to affect the contemporary debate over U.S. 
immigration policy. The most optimistic projections of the effects of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on economic growth 
in Mexico and the United States do not suggest that bi-national income 
convergence is just around the corner. A 2003 Congressional Budget 
Offi ce Study (2003, p. xiv) concluded that “NAFTA has increased U.S. 
GDP but by a very small amount—probably no more than a few billion 
dollars” and that the effects on Mexico were likely to be roughly the 
same size.
If economic growth in Mexico is important to the United States, 
it is diffi cult to tell. Other than trade policy and mild praise from U.S. 
offi cials for Mexico’s attempts to restrain the growth of its money sup-
ply and balance its federal budget, the United States has done little to 
promote economic growth in Mexico. Worse, it is diffi cult to claim that 
praise, restraining money supply growth, or balancing budgets contrib-
utes much to growth at all. An argument can be made that the United 
States has no right to interfere in the internal affairs of its neighbor to 
the south, despite a long record of doing so, but interference is not what 
I am suggesting.
A rapidly growing U.S. economy, operating at or near full capacity, 
is critical to Mexico’s economic growth. Thus, investment in education 
and worker training and an attack on the U.S. unemployment problem 
are essential to the long-term growth of the Mexican economy. The two 
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economies are interdependent and have been for some time (Musgrave 
1985). Interaction between the two countries is obvious in trade rela-
tions, investment patterns, labor-market activities, business cycles, and 
in the environmental arena. U.S.–Mexico interaction is asymmetric: 
policies and activities in the United States have much more of an effect 
in Mexico than the reverse.
Trade is a particularly important part of any economic growth sce-
nario in Mexico. Mexican exports constitute nearly a third of its GDP 
and now, as a century ago, nearly 90 percent of Mexico’s exports are 
destined for U.S. markets. Trade relations between the U.S. and Mex-
ico reinforce the notion that a growing U.S. economy is important for 
Mexico’s economic development. In the current (2008–2009) U.S. 
economic downturn, Mexico’s exports have plummeted. Between Janu-
ary 2008 and January 2009, Mexico’s exports declined by 30 percent 
(INEGI 2009). In previous U.S. downturns, particularly in 1981–1982, 
Mexico’s exports also decreased.
During the debate over NAFTA in the early 1990s, it was frequently 
argued that NAFTA would promote prosperity in Mexico and reduce 
Mexican migration to the United States. This was a false assertion, 
and there is little evidence that NAFTA has reduced U.S. immigration 
fl ows (Passel 2006; Scott, Sala, and Campbell 2006). In fact, in the 
year NAFTA took effect (1994), Mexico experienced its worst eco-
nomic crisis since the Great Depression. The United States had little 
choice except to put together a $50 billion fi nancial rescue package for 
Mexico, the third U.S. attempt to bolster the Mexican economy since 
the early 1980s (Peach 1995). Mexico willingly accepted the severe 
restrictions on its own domestic fi scal and monetary policy that came 
along with the various rescue plans. It is not impossible to infl uence 
Mexico’s policy stance and development strategies from north of the 
border, and the current economic crisis (2008–2009) may provide yet 
another opportunity to do so. The key question is whether this will be 
done in a constructive manner.
More meaningful economic-development policies toward Mexico 
are possible. A modern version of the Marshall Plan, involving large-
scale investments by the three NAFTA partners, is another possibility. 
Such a plan could be easily designed with an emphasis on education, 
transportation, and energy infrastructure needed to make NAFTA work 
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more effectively. The need for coordinated education, energy, and trans-
portation policies in the three nations has become apparent since NAFTA 
has been implemented, and such investments could stimulate economic 
growth in all three nations without threatening national sovereignty.
Another possibility is for the United States to provide several 
billion dollars in scholarships for Mexican students to study at U.S. 
universities, perhaps with the condition that they must return home af-
ter completion of their studies. This could benefi t both U.S. institutions 
of higher education and the Mexican economy. In fact, both nations 
already profi t from a sizeable Mexican program to subsidize the educa-
tion of its residents in the United States.
Many other economic-development programs could be devised 
with just a little imagination and could be paid for with some or all of 
the billions of dollars the United States already spends on various im-
migration enforcement activities along its southern border. The need 
to devise such programs is reinforced by the current global economic 
crisis. There are many signs that the Mexican economy is again in 
serious trouble. For example, Mexico’s real GDP decreased 8.2 per-
cent between the fi rst quarter of 2008 and the fi rst quarter of 2009, 
and Mexico’s exports decreased 35.6 percent between April 2008 and 
April 2009 (INEGI 2009). Another Mexican economic crisis would al-
most certainly increase the fl ow of migrants from Mexico to the United 
States, even if the U.S. economy is performing poorly. I suggest we 
adopt policies that will address both the immediate economic crisis, 
the long-term development needs of the United States and Mexico, and 
alter migration fl ows between the two nations. It is possible to do it 
all—reform immigration along the lines suggested by Briggs, improve 
enforcement, and promote economic development in Mexico. But, if 
we must choose between them, my choice is to emphasize economic 
development as the highest priority. 
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Notes
1. I believe that I learned “the opportunity cost of employing the unemployed is zero” 
from a course taught by Briggs, but memory is a frequently unreliable source.
2. No one does a better job of summarizing and explaining the evolution and subtle-
ties of U.S. immigration law than Briggs (1984, 2003).
3. As this chapter is being written, the Obama administration is also considering 
deploying troops and law enforcement agents to the border to prevent Mexican 
drug-cartel violence from spreading into the United States.
4. Border fences produce other forms of controversy and even amusement. In 2007, 
the Golden State Fence Company, hired to build portions of the border fence near 
San Diego, entered a guilty plea to charges that it hired illegal immigrants (as 
many as 250 of its 750 workers) to work on the fence (Horsley 2007). 
5. Partly because the United States and Mexico share a common border, migration 
from Mexico to the United States generally receives the most attention in the me-
dia, and this particular migration fl ow is often discussed in emotional terms. Of 
course, Mexico is not the sole source of U.S. immigration. The American Com-
munity Survey for 2006 (U.S. Census Bureau 2007) indicates that there were 37.5 
million foreign-born persons in the United States and that just 11.5 million (30.7 
percent) of those were born in Mexico. 
6. The American Community Survey estimates of the foreign-born population and 
the number and percentage of the foreign born who were born in Mexico are very 
similar to estimates from the Current Population Survey (CPS). See Camarota 
(2007) for an extended discussion of the CPS data.
7. Using GDP per person may not be the best comparison. The differences in per-
sonal income per person in the two nations may be much larger because exports 
account for a much larger share of GDP in Mexico than in the United States.
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